This paper provides a rationalization for using classical one-sided hypothesis tests for approving innovations, such as new drugs or treatment programs. I consider statistical testing as a strategy of the regulator in a game against informed proponents who can profit from the regulator's acceptance decision even for ineffective innovations. Lower test size deters proponents from attempting costly clinical trials to gain approval of innovations they know ex ante to be ineffective. I show that test size equal to the ratio of the proponents' cost of collecting data to their benefit from approval of a null innovation achieves minimax optimality for a regulator who prefers not to place any prior on the quality of potential innovations. It is also the limit of decision rules for Bayesian regulators as the assumed share of potential proponents with bad innovations converges to one. * Thanks to Larbi Type II errors. It is difficult to motivate this structure by considering statistical decision problems. Instead, both Bayesian and frequentist criteria generally seek to balance in some way the probabilities of both Type I and Type II errors.
Introduction
The practice of statistical hypothesis testing has been widely criticized for decades across many fields that use it. Examples of such criticism include Cohen (1994) , Johnson (1999) , and Ziliak and McCloskey (2008) . While conventional test levels of 1%, 5% and 10% are widely agreed upon, these numbers lack any substantive motivation, yet their arbitrary choice affects thousands of influential decisions. The hypothesis testing criterion also has an unusual lexicographic structure: first, ensure that the probability of Type I errors does not exceed a given conventional level under the null hypothesis, then do the best you can to reduce the probability of tool available to the regulator is to accept or reject them based on credible data. To deter the proponents of bad ideas, the probability of Type I errors (acceptance of bad innovations) has to be smaller than the ratio between the proponent's cost of collecting the evidence (e.g., clinical trials or acquiring other data that may provide supporting evidence for the idea) and the proponent's benefit from having the bad innovation accepted. This framework provides a decision-theoretic rationale for using one-sided hypothesis testing in some statistical treatment choice problems and a rule for choosing the test level.
Allowing for a bottomless supply of bad ideas may seem far-fetched. I show that the same solution could be obtained as a limit case if the regulator places a prior distribution over the quality of potentially proposed innovations. As the probability assigned to bad innovators increases, the regulator's optimal policy converges to the one-sided hypothesis test rule.
A couple of recent papers consider related problems of regulatory approval. Manski (2013) also advocates using randomized regulatory approval for deterring unwanted applications (as well as for diversification and learning). In contrast to this paper, randomization proposed Manski (2013) depends on readily observable characteristics of applications, rather than on statistical signals, and does not seek to reveal applicants' private information. Ottaviani and Henri (2013) study the problem of sequential research investment by an agent (e.g., a pharmaceutical company) indirectly controlled by regulatory approval. In their setting, the agent and the regulator share common beliefs about the probability of two possible states of the world. Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) consider persuasion in a setup where the two parties share the same prior about the state of the world, but have different payoffs from the receiver's action. They show that the sender may benefit (in expectation) from revealing to both parties a costless credible signal that is informative about the state and derive the optimal structure of this signal. The receiver then could use simple bayesian updating. In contrast to their setup, in my paper the sender has private information, which influences her decision whether to acquire costly evidence, and the receiver's commitment to a decision rule influences the sender's action.
The paper proceeds as follows: in the next section, I discuss why hypothesis testing criterion has been difficult to rationalize in statistical decision theory. Section 3 outlines a simple environment that motivates hypothesis testing rules as a minimax strategy for the regulator. Section 4 considers the problem with an additional assumption that the data satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio property, under which decision procedures have a simple threshold form.
In this setting, I show that decisions of Bayesian regulators converge to hypothesis testing rules as they become more pessimistic about the pool of potential proposals. Section 5 extends the problem to allow proponents of innovations to be uncertain about their effectiveness prior to collecting the evidence. I show that if the signal is normally distributed, hypothesis testing rules remain admissible and minimax. Section 6 deals with strategic choice of the cost and precision of evidence. Section 7 illustrates what could be the deterrent test levels for Phase III clinical trials.
Why the hypothesis testing criterion is hard to explain
Though it is widely used and intuitively appealing to many researchers, the classical hypothesis testing criterion is difficult to motivate in decision problems. When testing is used to choose between two alternative treatments, which is the focus of this paper, hypothesis testing criterion raises two questions. First, why is constraining the maximum probability of Type I errors lexicographically more important than minimizing the chance of Type II errors? While one type of errors could be more important than the other, typical decision criteria call for weighted consideration of both rather than just a constraint on one. Second, why only the probability of Type I errors is considered and not their magnitude? It would seem that the probability of mistakenly choosing the wrong treatment should be more important if there is a large difference in the effectiveness of the two, and less important if they are almost equally effective. This
paper proposes an answer to both of these questions.
Statistical decision problems have been analyzed as games against nature starting with Wald (1950) and Savage (1954) . First, nature "chooses" the unknown parameter value θ ∈ Θ. In this paper, θ will refer to the net effect of a new treatment, with the net effect of the status quo treatment normalized to zero. Then, statistical data X ∈ X is randomly drawn from probability distribution F (X; θ) that depends on the parameter θ. The statistician then makes a decision δ(X), possibly randomized, based on observed data. In case of hypothesis testing, the decision is binary: δ(X) = 1 if the alternative treatment is accepted, δ(X) = 0 if the status quo is chosen. The performance of the decision rule under each possible parameter value could be summarized by the expected loss
Usually, no decision rule minimizes (1) for all θ. The choice of δ then depends on the criterion used to deal with ambiguity of how nature chooses θ. The statistician could place a subjective prior distribution µ on Θ and minimize subjective expected loss E µ(θ) E F (X;θ) L(δ(X), θ). Alternatively, the statistician could look for a decision rule that performs uniformly well over Θ, for example, minimizing sup θ∈Θ E F (X;θ) L(δ(X), θ) (minimax criterion). Stoye (2011) provides an extensive overview of various uniform criteria and their axiomatic properties.
Discussions of hypothesis testing sometimes invoke a 1-K loss function that penalizes all Type I errors by K points and all Type II errors by 1 point:
In some problems, hypothesis tests with size α = 1 K+1 are minimax with this loss function. Tests with 5% significance level, for example, would then be minimax for a loss function that places 19 times more weight on any Type I error than on any Type II error. Loss function (2) does not provide a good rationalization for the use of classical hypothesis testing criterion in treatment choice. While minimax decision rules with this loss function (or Bayesian decision rules with various priors) could coincide with hypothesis testing rules, they do not motivate the lexicographic hypothesis testing criterion itself. The Type I/II error loss ratios corresponding to typical test levels (K=19 for 5% and K=99 for 1%) may seem rather large for many problems.
Furthermore, this loss function ignores the substantive magnitude of committed errors, assigning the same penalty for mistakenly approving either a treatment that is only infinitesimally worse or one that is greatly inferior.
A number of recent papers considered treatment choice as a statistical decision problem using regret loss function, which penalizes both Type I and Type II errors proportionately to the magnitude of the difference in treatment effects |θ|:
The optimal decision rules under both minimax and average risk (flat prior) decision criteria are essentially empirical success rules (Manski, 2004 (Manski, , 2005 ) that prescribe choosing the treatment that appears to be more successful in trials, whether by a small or by a wide margin (see also Stoye, 2009; Hirano and Porter, 2009; Schlag, 2007) . These decision rules are comparable to one-sided hypothesis tests with 50% level, rather than the conventional test levels of 5% or 1%.
The regret loss function could be easily modified to place greater weight on losses from Type I errors, similarly to (2) :
Minimax and average risk decision rules with this asymmetric loss function are similar to hypothesis testing rules in that innovations are approved only if the estimate of θ exceed some multiple of its standard error (Tetenov, 2012; Hirano and Porter, 2009 ). However, to obtain decision rules comparable to tests with conventional levels, the asymmetry factor K has to be much greater than with the 1-K loss function (2) . The difference is due to accounting for the magnitude of errors in the loss function, which makes mistakes for θ ≈ 0 almost irrelevant to the analysis. One-sided tests with 5% level are minimax optimal if K=102, while 1% tests are optimal if K=970 (Tetenov, 2012) . In contrast, loss aversion coefficient of K=3 would lead to a 34% one-sided test. While loss aversion seems like an intuitive way to motivate the asymmetry of conventional hypothesis tests, it cannot easily rationalize tests with levels similar to conventional levels and it cannot rationalize the hypothesis testing criterion itself.
Screening proponents through hypothesis testing
This section illustrates how the hypothesis testing could be optimal for regulatory approval under the minimax criterion. The results in this section do not rely on any statistical properties of the data generating process. Next section will impose the monotone likelihood ratio property on the distribution of clinical trial data, which allows a richer theoretical analysis (including prior beliefs about proponents for the regulator and allowing the proponents to be uncertain about the quality of their innovations).
There are two parties: the proponent of an innovation and the regulator. The regulator has to decide whether to accept or reject the proposed innovation. The quality of the innovation, which determines the parties' payoffs if it is accepted by the regulator, is θ ∈ Θ. The proponent knows θ, while the regulator does not (I analyze what happens if the proponent is uncertain about the value of θ in Section 5).
If the regulator accepts the innovation, the proponent gets a payoff of b(θ) and the regulator gets a payoff of v(θ). The payoff to both parties is zero if the regulator rejects the innovation.
The function b(θ) is known to the regulator. In the simple case when the proponent knows θ with certainty, we could assume b(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ Θ (b(θ) < 0 will be allowed in Section 5 dealing with uncertain proponents). Thus any proponent wants the regulator to approve his innovation.
Let Θ 0 = {θ : v(θ) < 0} be the set of innovations that are detrimental for the regulator to accept (the null hypothesis) and Θ 1 = {θ : v(θ) ≥ 0} the set of good innovations (the alternative hypothesis).
To convince the regulator that θ ∈ Θ 1 , the proponent could conduct a trial of the innovation that costs c > 0 and generates a sufficient statistic X ∈ X with probability distribution F (X; θ).
The data generating process F (X; θ) is known to both parties. The results of the trial then could be provided to the regulator. The full trial cost c is sunk before any data X is realized and the amount c is known to the regulator.
The regulator commits to using a statistical decision rule δ : X → [0, 1], where δ(X) denotes the probability with which the regulator will accept the innovation when the realized outcome of the trial is X. If the regulator commits to systematically use a publicly known decision rule, then she does not need to communicate with potential proponents until they decide to submit their proposals with the supporting data X and proof that cost c was sunk to obtain the data.
To summarize, the timing of the game is as follows. Regulator commits to an approval decision rule δ as a function of the statistic X (and of the publicly known characteristics b(θ) and c of the proponent). The proponent, knowing his type θ, chooses whether to invest c in collecting the data. If the proponent chooses to collect data, nature draws X according to the distribution F (X; θ). The proponent requests and the regulator grants approval if the realization of X is favorable (δ(X) = 1). The parties' payoffs are (δ(X) · b(θ) − c, δ(X) · v(θ)) if the proponent chooses to collect evidence and (0, 0) otherwise.
The ex ante probability that an innovation with parameter θ will be accepted following the trial is
Since δ(X) = 1 denotes rejection of the null hypothesis by the regulator, A δ (θ) is the test's power in statistical terms. Assuming that proponents are risk-neutral, it is optimal for them to invest in a trial if its expected payoff is positive, that is, if
Instead, proponents of type θ who face approval probability below this threshold will be deterred by the regulator's statistical decision rule from conducting trials.
The regulator's expected payoff when facing a proponent of type θ is
The regulator's payoff is zero for all θ such that A δ (θ) < c b(θ) . Otherwise, the expected payoff has the same sign as v(θ).
To achieve the maximum feasible payoff of zero for θ : v(θ) < 0, it is sufficient for the regulator to pick any decision rule such that A δ (θ) < c b(θ) . To achieve the same objective in a game against nature (in which the decision to conduct trials is not strategic), the regulator would have to pick a decision rule with A δ (θ) = 0. Only decision rules that reject innovations for all realizations of the data are minimax in a game against nature, which has led Manski (2004) to question the usefulness of the minimax decision criterion. In contrast, strategic entry decision by the proponent allows the regulator to employ non-degenerate decision rules even under the pessimistic minimax criterion.
Proposition 1 Any testing decision rule δ that controls size
is minimax for the regulator with respect to proponent type θ.
Proof. Minimax payoff for the regulator cannot be greater than zero, since zero is the highest possible payoff for θ ∈ Θ 0 . If δ satisfies (8), then the regulator's payoff equals zero for all θ ∈ Θ 0 .
The regulator's payoff is always non-negative for θ ∈ Θ 1 , hence δ is minimax.
If the proponent's payoff does not depend on θ (i.e., b(θ) = b), then condition (8) in Proposition 1 simplifies to
which is essentially a typical statistical test size control condition, with the requisite size of the test determined by economic parameters b and c.
There could be many alternative minimax testing decision rules, some of which could be inadmissible (weakly or strongly dominated by other decision rules). More structure has to be placed on the data distribution F (X; θ) to determine what decision rules are admissible. In the rest of the paper, I will imposes the monotone likelihood ratio property on F , which leads to a very strong characterization of admissible decision rules.
Minimax criterion is a conservative decision criterion for choice under ambiguity. In this case, the regulator's ambiguity about the distribution of θ among potential proponents. In the next section I will consider how minimax decision rules compare to optimal decision rules for regulators who could place a prior distribution on proponent type θ and show that minimax decision rules could be seen as a limit case as regulator places prior probability on θ ∈ Θ 0 approaching 1.
Minimax decision rules will be optimal (or nearly optimal) if the regulator believes that the supply of bad innovations (proponents with θ ∈ Θ 0 ) is almost bottomless compared to the supply of good ones. In many contexts, an unlimited number of potential proposals with v(θ) < 0 could be generated almost effortlessly, so the regulator may have a reason to be very pessimistic. The relevant distribution of proponent types is the distribution of potential
proponents, which is difficult to observe in practice. If some kind of deterrent policy is already in place (which is the case in all fields using some form of hypothesis testing), the distribution of deterred proponents is completely hidden from the regulator.
Proponents with precise knowledge of θ
To better understand the properties of hypothesis testing, it is useful to put some additional structure on the problem. In this section I will consider the statistical approval problem with real-valued parameter θ ∈ Θ ⊆ R, which describes the value of the innovation to the regulator: v(θ) = θ.
I will also assume that the sufficient statistic X of the collected data has distribution functions F (X; θ) with density f (x; θ) that satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio property:
Also, let the cumulative distributions F (X ≤ t; θ) be continuous in θ for all t, satisfying f (x; θ) > 0 for all x ∈ X and F (X; θ) = F (X; θ ) for θ = θ . A leading example is X ∼ N (θ, σ 2 ) for some known σ > 0.
Let the innovator's benefit from the acceptance decision b(θ) be continuous and non-decreasing in θ, with b(0) > 0, meaning that proponents are interested in getting approval for a range of ideas with θ < 0. The value that the proponent would obtain from acceptance of an idea with zero effect b (0) is the only parameter of this function that needs to be known to the regulator.
In this setting, it is sufficient for the regulator to consider monotone decision rules of the form:
Lemma 3 in Karlin and Rubin (1956) establishes that for any decision rule δ : X → [0, 1], there exists a unique monotone decision rule δ which yields higher approval probability for all good innovations and lower approval probability for bad ones:
The proponent's decision to conduct a trial is then higher under δ for positive θ and lower for negative θ:
Therefore, the regulator's payoff (7) from δ is at least as large as the payoff from δ for all θ.
The acceptance probability A δ (θ) of monotone decision rules is decreasing lexicographically in (T, λ) for every θ. There is a monotone decision rule δ * for which the acceptance probability at θ = 0 is exactly:
This decision rule is the same as a one-sided hypothesis test of H 0 : θ ≤ 0 with size c b(θ) . If X ∼ N (θ, σ 2 ) with known σ, then
Due to the monotone likelihood ratio property, the acceptance probability of monotone decision rules is increasing in θ, so innovations with θ < 0 all face acceptance probability below c b(0) and investing in trials is not optimal for their proponents. All innovations with θ > 0 face higher acceptance probability and their proponents will find it optimal to invest in trials. The following proposition shows that δ * is an admissible and minimax decision rule. All monotone decision rules with higher acceptance probability at θ = 0 are not minimax because they make it profitable for proponents with some θ < 0 to conduct trials and the regulator faces expected payoff below zero (which is the minimax value) for that type of proponents. Decision rules with lower acceptance probability at θ = 0 are minimax but are not admissible because δ * yields the same zero payoff for the regulator for all θ ≤ 0, but provides higher acceptance probability, hence higher payoffs, for θ > 0.
Proposition 2 Monotone decision rules δ * satisfying (14) are minimax and admissible.
Proof. Minimum expected payoff (over θ) for the regulator cannot be higher than zero, which is the payoff for θ = 0 no matter which decision rule the regulator chooses. To show that δ * is minimax, we just need to show that it yields nonnegative expected payoff to the regulator for all θ.
It is not optimal for potential proponents with θ < 0 to invest in collecting evidence because
The inequality follows from monotonicity of A δ * (·) and b(·). The regulator's payoff from facing this type of proponent is zero and cannot be improved by any decision rule.
For proponents with θ ≥ 0, the regulator's payoff is nonnegative for any decision rule. Hence δ * is minimax.
Decision rule δ * is admissible if there does not exist a decision rule δ which yields strictly better payoff for some value of θ and is at least as good as δ * for all values of θ. If any decision rule dominates δ * , then there is also a monotone decision rule δ that dominates δ * .
If A δ (0) > c b(0) , then, by continuity, A δ (θ )b(θ ) > c also for some θ < 0. This makes it profitable for the proponents of type θ to invest in trials. Then, the regulator's expected payoff is below zero at θ , hence δ cannot dominate δ * .
If A δ (0) < c b(0) , then also A δ (θ )b(θ ) < c for some θ > 0 , hence these proponents will not find it optimal to invest in trials and the regulator's expected payoff at θ will be zero. Under δ * , all proponents with θ > 0 will find it profitable to conduct trials, yielding strictly positive expected payoff to the regulator. Hence δ cannot dominate δ * .
Decision rules for Bayesian regulators
The idea of potentially unlimited entry of proponents with bad ideas may seem overstretched.
Below I show how hypothesis testing rules with test level (14) relate to decision rules of a regulator who has a prior distribution over the types of potential proponents. First, I show that the hypothesis tests with level (14) always set a higher threshold than Bayesian rules for approval of innovations. Second, I show that the hypothesis test rule is a limit of Bayesian procedures adopted by regulators who assume higher and higher proportion of potential proponents to have bad ideas. I will denote the proponent's type simply by θ and the regulator's prior over proponents' types by Q(θ) with density q (θ). For simplicity, let Q be atomless.
The regulator's expected payoff from using decision rule δ equals
It is sufficient to consider maximizing (17) over the set of monotone decision rules (11) . To simplify exposition, assume that F (X; θ) is also atomless, so that randomization λ on the threshold in monotone decision rules could be ignored. The regulator's maximization problem then reduces to a one-dimensional problem of finding an optimal threshold T :
Since
which it is profitable for proponents to collect data.
The first result is that for Bayesian regulators it is generally optimal to set the threshold lower than for the hypothesis test (14) . While a fraction of proponents with bad ideas (θ < 0) will find it optimal to try (and hence gain approval with some probability), this loss is offset by higher probability of success for proponents of good ideas.
Proposition 3
If the regulator believes that a positive measure of potential proponents have good ideas (Q (θ > 0) > 0), then the optimal decision rule δ T will have a lower threshold than the hypothesis test rule (14) .
Proof. The hypothesis test threshold T * is constructed so that A δ T * (0)b (0) = c, soθ (T * ) = 0 (only proponents with θ > 0 find it profitable to collect data). Consider the derivative of (18) with respect to T :
The first effect is that increasing T makes it unprofitable for proponents with θ slightly abovē θ (T ) to collect data, this effect is positive for T < T * and negative for T > T * (because then proponents of good innovations are deterred). The second effect is that increasing T reduces probability of approval for all proponents with θ >θ (T ). Evaluated at T = T * , the first term equals zero becauseθ (T * ) = 0 and the second term is negative because dA δ T (θ) /dT < 0, θ > 0 and q (θ) > 0 on a set of positive measure, so
Hence optimal threshold T is always smaller than T * .
The next result shows that if the regulator puts more and more prior mass on θ < 0, the thresholds of optimal decision rules converge to the hypothesis test threshold T * . and Q + (A) = Q (A ∩ (−∞, 0)). Let {a n } be an increasing sequence of numbers a n ∈ (0, 1) , a n → 1. Define a sequence of probability measures Q n = an Q((−∞,0)) Q − + 1−an Q([0,+∞)) Q + and the sequence of optimal decision rule thresholds T n that maximize (18) with respect to Q n . Then
Proof. It follows from Proposition 3 that T n < T * for all n. I proceed to show that given anȳ T < T * , T n >T for sufficiently large n.
For every n, V (δ Tn ) > V (δ T * ) > 0. On the other hand, I will show that for sufficiently large n, V (δ T ) < 0 for all T ≤T , hence T n >T . Since T ≤T < T * ,θ (T ) ≤θ T < 0 and
The first integral is negative (because it is taken over θ < 0) and the second is positive. For sufficiently large n, their weighted sum is negative, which implies that V (δ T ) < 0 for all T ≤T . This proposition shows that the hypothesis testing rule with level c b(0) could be interpreted as an approximation of Bayesian decision rules that would be taken by regulators sufficiently pessimistic about the pool of potential proponents seeking approval for their "innovations."
5 Proponents ex ante uncertain about the value of their proposals Proponents may have some information about the value of their innovation, but not enough to know θ exactly. The proponent's type in this case is π -the probability distribution that the proponent places on θ prior to collecting evidence. Here π ∈ ∆ could be any probability distribution on Θ ⊂ R with finite mean. The subset of degenerate distributions (beliefs of proponents certain about θ) will be denoted by ∆ 0 .
It is profitable for the proponent to invest in collecting evidence if
This payoff depends on the shape of the prior π in a nontrivial fashion, since A δ (θ) is nonlinear.
The regulator also needs to take into account that proponents may not want to seek approval for their innovations after observing the data X. This could happen if the proponent's posterior beliefs π(θ|X) place enough weight on θ for which b(θ) is negative. To accommodate this possibility in notation, denote the proponent's optimal decision whether to seek approval after observing the data by the function η π (X) = I Θ b(θ)dπ(θ|X) . The ex ante probability of approval then becomes
It turns out that threshold hypothesis testing rule (14) with test level c b(0) is also minimax and admissible in this setting if the proponent's benefit from approval b(θ) is concave in θ and
Examples of distributions for which
A δ (θ) is non-increasing in θ include the family of normal distributions X ∼ N (θ, σ 2 ) with known variance and the family of exponential distributions with means µ 0 + θ.
The following proposition shows that collecting evidence is only optimal for proponents with beliefs for which the regulator would also expect to receive positive payoffs.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the function b(θ) is non-decreasing and concave in θ, hypothesis test rule δ * given in (14) is used by the regulator, and
A δ * (θ) is non-increasing in θ. Whenever the regulator's expected payoff would be negative if proponents of type π collected data
it is not optimal for proponent to collect data:
Proof. See Appendix.
It follows from Proposition 5, that the regulator faces non-negative expected payoff from all proponent types π, hence δ * is minimax.
Proposition 6 Suppose that the function b(θ) is non-decreasing, continuous, and concave in θ, and that
A δ (θ) is non-increasing in θ for threshold decision rules δ. Then the hypothesis testing rule δ * in (15) is minimax and admissible with respect to π ∈ ∆.
Proof. For δ * to be inadmissible, there must be a different monotone decision rule δ that yields strictly better payoffs to the regulator for some π and does not yield worse payoffs for any π.
Any other monotone decision rule δ(X), however, either has A δ θ < A δ * θ for allθ > 0, in which case it yields lower expected payoff to the regulator for π that puts probability one onθ, or A δ (0) > c b(0) , in which case it yields negative payoffs to the regulator for some certain type of proponent with θ < 0.
It follows from Proposition 5 that the regulator's payoffs are non-negative for any π ∈ ∆ and they equal zero for π 0 that puts mass one on θ = 0. No decision rule could yield a higher minimum, since all decision rules yield payoff of zero for π 0 , hence δ * is minimax.
One-sided hypothesis testing rules with level c b(0) have attractive decision-theoretic properties if the regulator cannot place more precise restrictions on the distribution of different proponent types, at least if the evidence is normally distributed and the proponent's benefit from approval is concave in θ. It is unclear under what kinds of more general conditions the same result might hold.
The results of Propositions 5 and 6 do not apply if the benefit function b(θ) is not concave.
The following example illustrates that proponents with non-concave payoff functions b(θ) may find it profitable to test innovations that yield a negative expected payoff to the regulator. If the proponent's prior beliefs place probabilities π(θ = −1) = .9 and π(θ = 1) = .1, then the expected payoff from testing for the proponent is positive
while the expected payoff to the regulator is negative
Endogenous choice of testing cost and precision
So far, the choice of testing cost c and the data distribution F (X; θ) (for example, sample size) was fixed and not included as a step in the game. Even when proponents could choose (c, F (X, θ)), hypothesis test rules with the proposed level c b(0) remain effective as a deterrent for proponents with θ < 0, as long as the test level is based on their chosen trial costs. However, it may be optimal for the regulator to make the test stricter for some (c, F ) to persuade proponents to choose other values of (c, F ) that would yield higher expected payoff for the regulator.
I first illustrate that if all proponents were ex ante certain about the value of θ and could freely choose how much to spend on collecting evidence, the regulator would push all the proponents towards choosing c = b(0). This effectively replaces statistical signaling with pure monetary signaling of the proponent's type. 
weakly dominates δ * (c,F ) . For all innovators with θ > 0 it remains profitable to conduct testing and the approval rate for their innovations is 1, which yields the highest possible expected payoff to the regulator. On the other hand, attempting "data collection" remains unprofitable for innovators with θ < 0.
If b(θ) = b(0), then almost the same effect could be obtained by decision rules that only slightly depend on the statistical signal:
for ε → 0. The approval rate is smaller than one for θ < 0, which still makes it unprofitable for innovators with θ < 0 to conduct experiments. But for all θ > 0, the approval rate is closer to 1 then the approval rate under δ * (c,F ) for any ε ∈ (0, 1). Even when proponents could choose (c, σ), the results of Proposition 5 apply, hence δ * (X) is a minimax decision rule if b (·) is linear and π ∈ ∆. The problem is that we do not know whether it is admissible. For example, the decision rule δ 0 (X) = 0 that rejects all innovations is also minimax, since it always yields a payoff of zero to the regulator. It is not admissible because the hypothesis testing rule yields strictly higher payoffs to the regulator for some types of proponents and never less than zero. Similarly, we cannot yet rule out that when proponents could choose (c, σ) there may be decision rules that dominate the hypothesis testing rule δ * .
The following proposition is a small step towards resolving this problem. I show that if the proponent could choose between two pairs (c 1 , σ 1 ) and (c 2 , σ 2 ) with higher costs corresponding to more precise evidence, and if all types of proponents π ∈ ∆ are allowed, then the decision rule δ * is admissible. . Deterrence of frivolous proposals should be a serious concern. The pool of new chemical compounds that pharmaceutical companies could potentially propose is very large, with about 5,000-10,000 compounds entering the R&D pipeline per each approved drug (PhRMA, 2013).
If approval is based on a one-sided hypothesis tests against the status quo treatment, then this paper suggests that its significance level should be c b(0) . The trial cost c, in this case, is the present value of the costs of a Phase III clinical trial. The benefit b(0) is the present value of expected profits from the FDA approval of the drug, conditional on the treatment effect being zero. Both parameters vary a lot from drug to drug (Grabowski, Vernon and DiMasi, 2002;  DiMasi, Hansen and Grabowski, 2002) . 
Conclusion
The paper presented a new theory for the use of hypothesis testing rules in regulatory approval and for choosing the test levels. The probability of Type I errors for innovations with negative effects has to be contained to deter potential proponents from flooding the regulator with random policy proposals. The proposed test level is determined by the ratio of the proponent's testing costs over her expected benefits from the proposal's approval by the regulator. In this setting, hypothesis testing rules turn out to be admissible and minimax decision rules for the regulator with respect to the proponent's ex ante beliefs about the quality of the innovation. They can also be seen as a limit of testing rules adopted by Bayesian regulators who are sufficiently pessimistic about the proportion of frivolous proposals.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 5. because it is concave:b
Since b(θ) is non-decreasing, β ≥ 0.
The innovator's expected payoff from collecting evidence then equals
The integrand [b(θ)Aδ(θ) −c] is zero at θ = 0, positive for θ > 0 and negative for θ < 0. The same is true for θAδ (θ). Hence the ratio
is positive for all θ = 0. While it is not defined at θ = 0, it has a well-defined limit from both sides as θ → 0, by L'Hopital's rule The proof for θ > 0 is analogous.
Proof of Proposition 9. For δ * to be inadmissible, there has to exist another decision rule δ that satisfies condition (8) , gives the regulator payoffs at least as high as δ * for any type π of proponent, and gives strictly higher payoffs for at least one type π. In particular, δ cannot give lower payoffs to the regulator for any π.
First, I will show that such a decision rule δ must be equal to δ * for (c 1 , σ 1 ). This is established by considering proponents with beliefs that place mass one onθ > 0 forθ sufficiently close to zero. At θ = 0, A δ * (·;c 1 ,σ 1 ) (θ) > A δ * (·;c 2 ,σ 2 ) (θ). This implies that for a range of values ofθ > 0, proponents who believe that θ =θ prefer to choose (c 1 , σ 1 ) under δ * . By the Neyman-Pearson lemma, any decision rule based on X with variance σ 2 1 different from δ * (·; c 1 , σ 1 ) either violates (8) or offers lower probability of acceptance atθ, hence yields lower payoffs to the regulator. Because of the higher variance of X under the choice of (c 2 , σ 2 ), the probability of acceptance atθ is also lower under any decision rule δ (·; c 2 , σ 2 ) if the proponent is enticed to choose (c 2 , σ 2 ) instead.
With δ (·; c 1 , σ 1 ) = δ * (·; c 1 , σ 1 ) fixed, I will show that also any deviations from δ * (·; c 2 , σ 2 ) will either violate (8) or reduce the regulator's payoffs for some proponent type π. I will consider proponents with two point priors that place weight q on θ 1 < 0 and weight 1 − q on θ 2 > 0. In particular, choose θ 2 sufficiently high so that A δ * (·;c 2 ,σ 2 ) (θ 2 ) − c 2 > A δ * (·;c 1 ,σ 1 ) (θ 2 ) − c 1 . This is possible because as θ → ∞, A δ * (·;c 2 ,σ 2 ) (θ 2 ) − c 2 → 1 − c 2 , while A δ * (·;c 1 ,
For a given q and a decision rule δ (·; c 2 , σ 2 ), the proponent's expected payoff from collecting evidence with cost/precision (c 2 , σ 2 ) equals b · q A δ(·;c 2 ,σ 2 ) (θ 1 ) − c 2 + (1 − q) A δ(·;c 2 ,σ 2 ) (θ 2 ) − c 2 .
For δ * , A δ * (·;c 2 ,σ 2 ) (θ 1 ) − c 2 < 0, while A δ * (·;c 2 ,σ 2 ) (θ 2 ) − c 2 > 0, so it is optimal to collect evidence if q >q for someq. Furthermore, A δ * (·;c 1 ,σ 1 ) (θ 1 ) < A δ * (·;c 2 ,σ 2 ) (θ 1 ) and A δ * (·;c 1 ,σ 1 ) (θ 2 ) < A δ * (·;c 2 ,σ 2 ) (θ 2 ), so it is not optimal for the proponent with any q to choose (c 1 , σ 1 ) under δ * . Under any alternative δ (·; c 2 , σ 2 ), A δ(·;c 2 ,σ 2 ) (θ 2 ) must be lower than A δ * (·;c 2 ,σ 2 ) (θ 2 ) by the Neyman-Pearson lemma. If also A δ(·;c 2 ,σ 2 ) (θ 1 ) ≤ A δ * (·;c 2 ,σ 2 ) (θ 1 ), then there is a range of values of q for which it is no longer profitable for the proponent to test the innovation under δ, while it was profitable under δ * , hence the regulator receives a lower payoff (the regulator's payoff under δ * was positive by Proposition 5). If instead A δ(·;c 2 ,σ 2 ) (θ 1 ) > A δ * (·;c 2 ,σ 2 ) (θ 1 ), then the regulator's payoff is lower because the probability of accepting the innovation if it is good (θ = θ 2 > 0) has been reduced, while the probability of accepting the innovation if θ = θ 1 < 0 has been increased.
